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Case No. 20100162-SC 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
JESUS A. JIMENEZ, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court granted Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the 
court of appeals' decision in State v. Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, 223 P.3d 461 
(Addendum A). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(5) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
"Whether the court of appeals erred in rejecting Petitioner's appellate 
arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error in relation to his 
conviction for aggravated robbery and the imposition of a dangerous weapon 
enhancement." Order dated May 26, 2010. 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court 
of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, | 9, 22 P.3d 1242. "The 
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately 
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are included in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2007); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
District court proceedings. The State charged Defendant Jesus Jimenez, as a 
party to the offenses, with one count of murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2007), and one count of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). Rl-3. 
The State also charged Defendant with use of a dangerous weapon in the 
commission of the aggravated robbery and sought an enhanced penalty under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004). Id. 
A jury trial was held. R76-79. After the State rested, Defendant's trial counsel 
moved to dismiss, arguing that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that Defendant, who drove Miguel Mateos to and from the 
robbery site, knew that Mateos intended to commit a robbery. See R78, R149:8. The 
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court asked, "Do you believe that they have to show prior knowledge that he had a 
gun on him?" R149:8. Counsel answered, "No, just that he was going in . . . [to] 
commit a robbery." Id. The trial court detailed evidence that Defendant had driven 
repeatedly past the salon, slowed down as he went by, and — after dropping Mateos 
at the site—told his girlfriend, Cassandra Matern, that she had better get down. Id. 
The trial court reasoned that a jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that 
Defendant knew that he was helping Mateos commit a robbery. Id. The court 
therefore denied the motion. Id. 
Before closing argument, the trial court asked both counsel, "You have no 
objection to the instructions?" R149:25. Both said they did not. Id. 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts and found that Defendant 
was subject to the enhanced penalty. R79. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 
an indeterminate prison term of fifteen years to life on his murder conviction and to 
a consecutive enhanced prison term of six years to life on his aggravated robbery 
conviction. R131-32. 
Proceedings in the court of appeals. Defendant appealed, claiming that the 
evidence did not show that he knew the principal carried a gun and, therefore, was 
insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated robbery. Defendant also claimed 
error in the jury instruction setting forth the elements of the dangerous weapon 
enhancement. He argued plain error, manifest injustice, and ineffective assistance 
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of counsel to justify review of his unpreserved claims. The court of appeals rejected 
Defendant's claims and affirmed his convictions. See Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 15, 2007, Defendant and Cassandra Matern picked up Miguel 
Mateos in Defendant's green Honda. R148:57-61. Defendant drove to The Shop, a 
beauty salon near the intersection of California Avenue and Navajo Street in Salt 
Lake City. R148:40, 61-62; see also R148:20-21. Defendant first headed west on 
California, then flipped around and traveled back east, and then went west again. 
R148:62-63. Defendant then turned onto Navajo heading south, flipped north, and 
then flipped south again. R148:63. In all, Defendant and his companions drove 
past the salon about five times. R148:64; see also Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 2. 
Twelve-year-old Laura Hernandez, whose sister Faviola ran the salon, was 
playing with her little brother, Junior, at a school playground nearby. R148:34-35. 
They saw a green car pass the salon several times. R148:36-37. Each time the car 
passed the salon, the driver slowed down and then stepped on the gas. R148:37-38; 
see also Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, ^ 3. 
Inside the car, Defendant and Mateos were speaking in Spanish. R148:64. 
Cassandra, wfro spoke only a little Spanish, did not understand very much of their 
conversation. R148:64-65. About the third time they passed the salon, Cassandra 
became suspicious. R148:66. Defendant finally stopped his car south of the salon, 
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and Mateos got out. R148:66-67. Defendant then flipped the car around and 
repeatedly told Cassandra that she had "better get down." R148:66-68. Cassandra 
got down. R148:68; see also Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 4. 
Mateos entered the salon. R148:22. Faviola Hernandez, the salon operator, 
was inside with a customer, Leonel Hernandez, and Laura and Junior, who had 
come in from the playground. R148:21-23. Mateos demanded money and pointed a 
gun at Leonel, telling him to get onto the ground. R148:22. He told Laura and 
Junior to get on the floor. R148:47. When Laura looked up, he pointed the gun at at 
the children and Faviola said, "No. No, not the kids." Id.; see also Jimenez, 2009 UT 
App 368, | 5. 
Mateos asked for Leonel's wallet and repeatedly asked Faviola for money. 
R148:22-23. Leonel got the money out of his wallet and told Faviola to give Mateos 
her money. R148:25. Faviola went into the back of the salon and came back with 
the gun that she kept for protection. R148:25, 43. Leonel then heard a gunshot. 
R148:25. Mateos ran out. Id. Faviola told Leonel that she had been shot. Id. Inside, 
Leonel locked the front door, saw blood coming from Faviola's chest, called 911, and 
tried to administer aid. R148:27; see also Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, | 5. 
Outside, Cassandra also heard the gunshot. R148:68. She told Defendant to 
leave, but Defendant refused. Id. Mateos ran out of the salon and got into the back 
seat, and Defendant drove away. R148:69; see also Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 6. 
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Defendant, Cassandra, and Mateos drove to a Wal-Mart, where Defendant 
and Mateos hid the gun behind the stereo in Defendant's car. R148:69. Mateos 
changed his shirt. R148:70. Later, after the three had dinner, Defendant and 
Cassandra took Mateos home. R14870-71; see also ]imenez, 2009 UT App 368, \ 6. 
Faviola died at the salon. R148:136~37; see also Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368,1f 5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Aggravated robbery. In the court of appeals, Defendant claimed for the first 
time that he could not be convicted as a party to aggravated robbery without a 
showing that he knew that Mateos, the principal, had a weapon. He therefore 
claimed that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte dismissing the 
aggravated robbery charge and that his defense counsel was ineffective for not 
moving to dismiss it. The court of appeals correctly rejected Defendant's claim. 
As a preliminary matter, the court of appeals need not have reached the claim 
at all. As the court of appeals recognized, Defendant could have been convicted of 
aggravated robbery not on the gun element, but on the alternative ground that he 
aided Mateos in a robbery that resulted in serious bodily injury. Where an 
alternative and unchallenged basis existed to support the trial court's submission of 
the charge to the jury, the court of appeals was not required to review Defendant's 
claim on the merits. 
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In any event, the court of appeals correctly rejected Defendant's claims of 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. Invited error precluded 
Defendant's plain error claim. Moreover, Defendant failed to demonstrate either 
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant claimed that he could not 
be convicted as a party to aggravated robbery without a showing that he knew that 
Mateos [the principal] had a weapon. The court of appeals correctly rejected this 
claim because the relevant statutes do not require that an accomplice know that a 
principal has a gun during the robbery. Moreover, even if such knowledge was 
required, the evidence established that Defendant knew about the gun and 
nevertheless aided Mateos in the course of the robbery. 
Penalty enhancement In the court of appeals, Defendant also claimed for the 
first time that the trial court's penalty enhancement jury instruction was erroneous 
because it did not require the jury to find that he knew that a dangerous weapon 
was present. Defendant, who had not preserved the claim below, argued that the 
error resulted in manifest injustice and that his defense counsel was ineffective for 
not objecting to the instruction. The court of appeals correctly concluded that 
Defendant invited any error below, thus foreclosing review for manifest injustice. 
The court of appeals also correctly concluded that, while counsel performed 
deficiently for failing to object to the instruction, the failure was not prejudicial. As 
the court of appeals correctly recognized, no prejudice resulted because even though 
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the instruction failed to require the jury to find that Defendant knew a gun was 
present, the evidence established that Defendant did, in fact, know that Mateos had 
a gun. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Defendant first claims that the court of appeals erred for affirming his 
conviction for aggravated robbery. He argues that the evidence did not establish 
that he knew about the gun and was therefore insufficient to support a conviction. 
Consequently, he asserts that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte 
dismissing the aggravated robbery charge and that trial counsel was ineffective for 
not moving to dismiss the charge. 
A. This Court may affirm the court of appeals7 decision based on an 
alternative and unchallenged ground for submitting the 
aggravated robbery charge to the jury. 
As a preliminary matter, while this Court may choose to address the court of 
appeals' holding on Defendant's gun element claims, it should affirm his 
aggravated robbery conviction whether or not it finds error in the court of appeals' 
analysis. As the State argued on appeal and as the court of appeals held, an 
alternative and unchallenged ground survived to support the trial court's sending 
the aggravated robbery charge to the jury. 
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Relevant law. When challenging a court's decision on appeal, a defendant 
"must address all of the circumstances upon which the court's decision was based/7 
State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, % 20,95 P.3d 1216, affd, 2005 UT 48,122 R3d 571. 
When the defendant challenges only some of those bases, this Court "need not 
determine whether the trial court erred in considering th[ose]... bas[e]s" because 
the other bases survive to support the trial court's decision. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 
801, 810 (Utah App. 1998); see also Andersen v. Professional Escrow Services, Inc., 118 
P.3d 75, 78 (Idaho 2005) (appellants' failure to challenge on appeal trial court's 
alternative grounds requires dismissal of their case); Greenwood v. Blackjack Cattle 
Co., 464 P.2d 281,283 (Kan. 1970) (when trial court's decision is based on alternative 
grounds, appellant's failure to challenge all grounds on appeal "renders 
unnecessary" a decision on the issue that is raised); San Antonio Press, Inc. v. Custom 
Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. App. 1993) (where an alternative ground 
supporting a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm; 
otherwise, "an appellant could avoid the adverse effect of a separate and 
independent basis for the judgment by ignoring it and leaving it unchallenged"); 5 
Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 775 ("[W]here a separate and independent ground 
from the one appealed supports the judgment made below, and is not challenged on 
appeal, the appellate court must affirm.") (citing cases). 
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Analysis. Defendant did not claim in the court of appeals and does not now 
claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of robbery. See Br. 
Appellant on Writ of Certiorari (hereinafter Br. Petitioner) at 34 ("While there may 
have been evidence indicating that Jimenez intended to aid in the underlying 
robbery, there was no evidence indicating he intended the use of a weapon . . . ."). 
He claims only that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew that Mateos, 
the principal, had a gun and, therefore, was insufficient to establish that Defendant 
was a party to aggravated robbery. Br. Petitioner at 22, 37. But, as recognized by 
the court of appeals, another ground survives to support the trial court's decision. 
Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 13. 
A defendant may be convicted of aggravated robbery under three different 
circumstances: if in the course of committing robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon" or "causes serious bodily upon another" or "takes or attempts 
to take an operable motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Here, the jury was 
instructed that they could find Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery based on 
either of the first two alternatives — use of a weapon or causing serious bodily injury. 
See R117. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew that 
Mateos, the principal, had a gun. Br. Petitioner at 22-23. He claims that, absent such 
knowledge, he cannot be convicted as a party to an aggravated robbery simply 
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because a gun is used. See id. at 24-25. But he does not challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence to show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury and death during 
the robbery. See id. Nor does he argue that he cannot be convicted as a party to 
aggravated robbery based on the serious injury that occurred. See id. Thus, he has 
not challenged a surviving alternative basis for the trial court's not sua sponte 
dismissing his aggravated robbery charge and for the court of appeals' affirming his 
convictions below. 
The court of appeals rejected Defendant's "gun element" claims. Jimenez, 2009 
UT App 368, % 13. But, as explained, the court also set forth an alternative basis for 
affirming his aggravated robbery conviction: "Furthermore, Defendant could have 
been convicted of aggravated robbery not on the gun element, but on the alternate 
ground that he facilitated escape after Mateos 'cause [d] serious bodily injury upon 
another.'" Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(l)(b)) (alterations in original). 
Consequently, the court of appeals correctly affirmed the aggravated robbery 
conviction. 
B. This Court should not review Defendant's aggravated robbery 
conviction for plain error, where Defendant invited the alleged 
error below. 
Moreover, this Court should not review the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support Defendant's aggravated robbery conviction on the basis of plain error. 
While Defendant argued in the court of appeals and now argues in this Court that 
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the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew a gun was present, Defendant 
invited any error when he affirmatively represented to the trial court that such 
knowledge was not required. 
Relevant law. To obtain appellate review, a party ordinarily must first raise 
the issue in the trial court. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164 P.3d 366. To 
preserve an issue for appeal, the objection must be timely, specific, and supported 
by evidence or relevant legal authority. Id. This rule is "based on the premise that, 
'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity 
to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it/" Id. (quoting State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, *h 33, 122 P.3d 543). While an appellate court may review an 
unpreserved claim for plain error or manifest injustice, it will do so only if the 
appellant argues that plain error or exceptional circumstances justifies review. Id. at 
16. 
But this Court has consistently held that invited error precludes even plain 
error review. See Pratt, 2007 UT 41,1j 16; State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,114,128 P.3d 
1171; State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111; State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 
t 62, 114 P.3d 551; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, If 9, 86 P.3d 742. Under the 
invited error doctrine, the appellate courts will not engage in plain error review 
when "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] 
-12-
court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]/" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 16 
(quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4, % 14) (alterations in original). 
The invited error doctrine '"arises from the principle that a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error/" Id. at ^ 17 (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 15). The doctrine 
recognizes that parties are "not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial 
and the benefit of objecting on appeal." Id. at f^ 17 (citation and internal quotation 
omitted). It discourages parties "from intentionally misleading the trial court so as 
to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. It is "designed to . . . 
inhibit a defendant from foregoing . . . an objection with the strategy of enhancing 
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,... claiming on 
appeal that the court should reverse." Id. at f^ 17 n.18 (citations and internal 
quotation omitted). 
Proceedings in trial court. Defense counsel moved to dismiss at the close of 
the State's case-in-chief. R149:8. Defense counsel claimed that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish aggravated robbery. Id. Counsel stated, "The evidence is . . . 
that everyone has identified the person who killed [Faviola] as someone by the 
name of Miguel Mateos. And I don't believe that they've met their burden of 
showing that [Defendant] knew that Mr. Mateos was going in with a gun to do a 
robbery and in the course of that robbery ended up killing someone." Id. 
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Trying to flesh out counsel's claim, the trial court questioned, "Do you believe 
that they have to show prior knowledge that [Mateos] had a gun on him?" Id. 
Defense counsel replied, "No, just that he was going in. . . [to] [c]ommit a robbery." 
Id. 
Thus, in clarifying the insufficiency claim, defense counsel affirmatively 
represented that the law did not require that Defendant have knowledge that a gun 
would be used, but only that a robbery would be committed. Id. 
Analysis, Defendant did not preserve the claim he raises on appeal in the 
trial court. The trial court received no notice Defendant claimed that the aggravated 
robbery charge should be dismissed because he did not know about the gun. 
Instead, defense counsel specifically claimed that the evidence failed to show that 
Defendant knew that Mateos planned to commit a robbery. See R149:8. 
In clarifying the limited claim, defense counsel stopped the trial court from 
addressing the very issue Defendant later brought on appeal and "led the trial court 
into committing the [alleged] error." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, «J 16 (quoting Winfield, 2006 
UT 4, f^ 15); see also R149:8. Defendant's invited error is a classic example of 
someone trying to "have his cake and eat it too." It should have precluded plain 
error review of his claim on appeal. 
Proceedings in the court of appeals. The court of appeals did not address the 
State's invited error argument. Instead, having concluded that "[t]he statutes do not 
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require that the jury find that Defendant knew that Mateos had a gun before or 
during the robbery," the court of appeals simply held that there was no "deficient 
performance by defense counsel or error by the trial court related to Defendant's 
conviction of aggravated robbery." Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 13. But, in fact, 
Defendant was not—and is not—entitled to any plain error review. 
C. The court of appeals correctly rejected Defendant's claim that the 
trial court committed plain error for not sua sponte dismissing 
the aggravated robbery charge. 
Alternatively, assuming arguendo that Defendant was entitled to plain error 
review of his "gun element" claim, the court of appeals correctly rejected the claim. 
]imenez, 2009 UT App 368,113. To establish plain error, defendant must show that 
(1) an error occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(3) the error was harmful. ]imenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 9 (citing State v. Lee, 2006 UT 
5, f 26,128 P.3d 1179). 
In reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction, this Court will "view[] the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict" and then determine whether the 
evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he or she was convicted." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18,10 P.3d 
346 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993) (internal quotations 
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omitted)). Where the alleged insufficiency is raised in the context of a plain error 
claim, this Court will then " determine whether the evidentiary defect was so 
obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury/7 Id. 
1. No error occurred, 
a. No error occurred. As the court of appeals correctly 
concluded, the statutory scheme does not require an 
accomplice's knowledge that a weapon is present. 
Defendant claimed in the court of appeals that the trial court plainly erred in 
not sua sponte dismissing the aggravated robbery charge for lack of evidence that 
Defendant knew that Mateos possessed a gun. Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f^ 11. The 
court of appeals properly held that the relevant statutes do not require that an 
accomplice know that a gun is present. 
As the court of appeals held, Defendant's conduct "f [e]ll squarely within the 
statutory scheme of accomplice liability for aggravated robbery/' Id. at f 13. 'To 
establish accomplice liability for aggravated robbery, the State must show that 
Defendant 'solicited], requested], encourage[d], or intentionally aid[ed]' Mateos in 
committing an aggravated robbery/' Id. at ^ 12 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(2008)). A "person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he [a] uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon [or] (b) causes serious 
bodily injury upon another." Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1)) (alteration in 
original). An act is "in the course of committing a robbery if it occurs in an attempt 
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to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3) (emphasis added). 
Further, Utah law sets forth the elements of simple robbery: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts 
to take personal property in the possession of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to 
deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the 
personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
force against another in the course of committing a theft 
or wrongful appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be 'in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation' if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful 
appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after tlte attempt or commission. 
Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368,112 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) & (2) (emphasis 
in original). The court of appeals held that "[tjhese statutes do not state that 
accomplice liability for aggravated robbery requires that the accomplice knew a 
weapon was present." Id. 
That holding is consistent with this Court's opinion in State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 
1052 (Utah 1985). There, the Court held that "to convict [Smith] of aggravated 
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robbery . . . , the jury had to find that defendant solicited, requested, commanded, 
encouraged, or intentionally aided another person or persons to engage in robbery; 
[Smith] did so intentionally and knowingly; and a deadly weapon, firearm, or 
facsimile of a firearm was used in the commission of the crime/' Id. at 1056. In 
setting for the elements of aggravated robbery, this Court did not hold that an 
accomplice to aggravated robbery must know a weapon is present, only that a 
weapon be used. See Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 12. 
Moreover, the holding is consistent with the Legislature's policy decision that 
those participating in any robbery, whether as principals or as accomplices, who 
intend that a robbery be committed, face strict liability for the use of a gun or for 
serious bodily injury. That is, when an accomplice intentionally helps another 
person commit a robbery, the accomplice will be liable for aggravated robbery if a 
co-perpetrator uses a gun or causes serious bodily injury, whether or not the 
accomplice knows of the gun or intends the injury. Any party— principal or 
accomplice--who participates in a robbery assumes the risk that someone may 
resort to the use of a dangerous weapon and/or cause serious bodily injury. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. 
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b. No error occurred because the evidence established that 
Defendant knew a gun was present 
Alternatively, even assuming Utah law requires that an accomplice know that 
the principal has a gun, Defendant's plain error claim fails. * As the court of appeals 
recognized, the evidence established that Defendant did, in fact, know that Mateos, 
the principal, had a gun and aided Mateos in the robbery after knowing that Mateos 
had used the gun. Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, \ 13. First, the evidence established 
that Defendant planned the robbery with Mateos and knew what was about to 
occur. See R148:64-68. Defendant drove Mateos to the site, helped "case out" the 
salon, and repeatedly drove past it, slowing down as he did so, and then speeding 
up afterward. See R148:64-68. More directly, the evidence established that 
Defendant dropped off Mateos near the salon, drove past the salon, and waited for 
Mateos to come out, all the while repeatedly telling Cassandra that she had "better 
get down." R148:66-68. This evidence supports the inference that Defendant knew 
that gun fire might occur and, in turn, knew that Mateos was carrying a gun. 
Even more clearly, the evidence established that while Defendant and 
Cassandra waited in the getaway car for Mateos, a gunshot rang out. See R148:68. 
Cassandra testified that she heard it, and the jury could readily have inferred that 
1
 Defendant has not marshaled the evidence relevant to his underlying 
insufficiency claim, and this Court should reject his claim on that basis alone. See 
State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16, 989 P.2d 1065. 
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Defendant heard it too. See id. Over Cassandra's protestations, however, Defendant 
refused to leave and remained on the scene to aid Mateos in his flight from the 
robbery site after Defendant knew that a gun had been used. See id. Thus, even if 
Defendant did not earlier know of the gun, he intentionally aided Mateos after he 
heard the shot and knew that Mateos had a gun. "An act [is] considered to be 'in 
the course of committing a robbery7 if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission or a 
robbery." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2). 
Thus, as the court of appeals also recognized, the evidence established that 
Defendant intentionally aided Mateos "in the course of committing a robbery," 
knowing that Mateos had a gun. Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 13. 
Because the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Defendant 
knew that Mateos, the principal, had a gun and still intentionally aided him, 
Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that submitting the aggravated robbery 
charge to the jury was plain error. Assuming arguendo that specific knowledge of 
the weapon was necessary, the evidence supports the jury's finding that Defendant 
knew that Mateos had the gun. The court of appeals, therefore, correctly rejected 
Defendant's claim that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte dismissing the 
aggravated robbery charge at the close of the State's case-in-chief. See Jimenez, 2009 
UT App 368, % 13. 
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2. If error occurred, it was not obvious. No settled precedent 
required that an accomplice know that a dangerous 
weapon is present. 
Alternatively, if error occurred, it was not obvious. An error is obvious only if 
"the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made/7 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,116,95 P.3d 276. "Utah courts have repeatedly held that 
a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the 
trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989); State v. Braun, 778 P.2d 1336,1341-42 (Utah App. 
1990)). 
Here, no settled precedent requires that an accomplice know that a principal 
possesses a gun before the accomplice can be found guilty as a party to aggravated 
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robbery. And, as explained, this Court's opinion in State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 
(Utah 1985), suggests that such knowledge is not required.2 
2
 In re I.R.C., 2010 UT 41,232 P.3d 1040, and State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49,661 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14, were decided after the court of appeals filed its decision in this case, 
but before Defendant filed his petitioner's brief. Defendant does not cite either case 
as authority. Nor could he. In I.R.C., the trial court bound a juvenile over to be 
prosecuted as an adult on aggravated robbery charges. 2010 UT 41, ^ 1. The 
juvenile appealed, arguing that the bindover was improper because the evidence 
did not establish that he knew a weapon was present. Id. at f^ 14. In responding, the 
State did not argue that such evidence was unnecessary, but that the evidence 
established probable cause that the juvenile knew about the weapon. On 
certification from the court of appeals, this Court affirmed the juvenile court's 
decision to bind the juvenile over for trial as an adult. Id. at | 31. This Court held 
that the evidence sufficed to show probable cause to believe that the juvenile knew 
about the weapon. Id. at f 25, Because both the juvenile and the State proceeded on 
the assumption that such evidence was necessary, its necessity was not addressed. 
See id. Consequently, this Court did not address its prior holding in State v. Smith, 
706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985), which at least strongly suggests that such evidence is not 
required. See I.R.C., 2010 UT 41. 
In Jeffs, this Court held that "'[t]o show accomplice liability, the State must 
show than an individual acted with both the intent that the underlying offense be 
committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense.'" Id. at f 51 
(quoting State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, | 13, 197 P.3d 628). The intent required to 
commit aggravated robbery is the intent to commit a simple robbery — "unlawfully 
and intentionally tak[ing] or attempt[ing] to take personal property in the possession 
of another from his person" or "intentionally or knowing us [ing] force or fear of force 
against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 & 302. Here, Defendant expressly concedes "there may 
have been evidence indicating that [he] intended to aid in the underlying robbery." 
See Br. Petitioner at 34. In so doing, he concedes that the evidence establishes that he 
intended that a robbery be committed and that he intended to aid Mateos in 
committing it. 
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Defendant cites no Utah precedent requiring that an accomplice know that the 
principal has a weapon.3 He relies instead on three cases from the Fifth Circuit and 
one case from the United States Supreme Court. The Fifth Circuit decisions are not 
precedent for Utah courts. Moreover, the decisions, United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 
434 F.3d 750, 757-58 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 & 757-
58 (5th Cir. 1998); and United States v. Thompson, 454 F.3d 459,466 (5th Cir. 2006), are 
distinguishable because they arise, not in cases of aggravated robbery, but in cases 
involving convictions for aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm 
during a crime of violence, see Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d at 757-59; Sorrells, 145 F.3d at 
753-55; and for brandishing a firearm during a bank robbery, Thompson, 454 F.3d at 
(5th Cir. 2006), all in violation of federal law. Defendant's fourth case, Bailey v. 
3Defendant cites to a number of Utah cases in support of his argument. All 
are distinguishable. Defendant cites In re M.B., 2008 UT App 433,198 P.3d 1007; In 
re V.T, 2000 UT App 189,5 P.3d 1234; and State v. Labmm, 959 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 
1998). See Br. Petitioner at 26. These three cases hold only that "mere presence" at a 
crime scene is not sufficient to support a finding of party liability. Rather, an 
accomplice must encourage or intentionally aid the principal. See M.B., 2008 UT 
App 433, ^ 647; V.T, 2000 UT App 189, | 10; Labrum, 959 P2d at 123-24, 
Defendant also cites State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990). See Br. Petitioner at 
26. Webb does not suggest or hold that an aggravated robbery conviction requires a 
party's knowledge that a principal possesses a weapon. Rather, Webb simply holds 
that there was credible evidence that Webb, who solicited the theft of a getaway car 
used in the robbery and located a purchaser for the goods prior to the robbery, was 
not "merely present." See id. at 84-85. 
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United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), is also distinguishable. Bailey held that under 
now-amended federal law, a conviction for use of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 924(c)(1) requires some active employment of a firearm, rather than mere 
possession of the firearm. See id. at 150. These cases have little, if any, relevance to 
Defendant's argument that Utah statutory law requires that an accomplice to 
aggravated robbery know that the principal possesses a gun. 
Moreover, a number of other courts have held that aggravated robbery does 
not require proof that an accomplice knew that the principal had a gun. While their 
statutes are not necessarily identical to Utah's, their analysis is informative. New 
York courts, for instance, have held that New York's statutes do not require that the 
prosecution establish "[mjental culpability with respect to any of the aggravating 
factors that elevate a [simple] robbery" to an aggravated robbery. See, e.g., People v. 
Parker, 468 N.Y.S.2d 731,731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). For this reason, "The People do 
not have to prove as an element of robbery in the first degree . . . that a defendant 
knew that his accomplices intended to use, or threaten the immediate use of, a 
dangerous instrument." Id. 
And other courts do not require direct or explicit evidence that a party knew 
before a robbery that a dangerous weapon would be used. Rather, they hold that 
the fact finder can infer from the accomplice's participation in the robbery that the 
use of a weapon was foreseeable. The First Circuit, for instance, has held that 
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evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery where the 
accomplice helped the principal plan a robbery, drove the principal to the robbery 
site, and waited for and escaped with him, even in the absence of direct testimony 
that the accomplice knew a weapon would be used. See United States v. Sanborn, 563 
F.2d 488, 490 (1st Cir. 1977). In so holding, the First Circuit reasoned that under 
these circumstances, a jury could "conclude that an accomplice so closely associated 
with the venture could not fail to know what would be the central question in any 
robbery: how the robbers were to force the bank's employees to part with the 
money." Id. 
North Carolina has held that a jury can find a defendant guilty of aggravated 
robbery, even without explicit knowledge that a co-defendant carried a weapon, 
where it was reasonably foreseeable that a robbery could become an armed robbery. 
See State v. Walker, 572 S.E.2d 866,870 (N.C. App. 2002). The court upheld Walker's 
conviction against a claim that "there [wa]s no evidence that defendant knew that 
any of the co-defendants were armed," reasoning that a party to robbery may also 
be found guilty as a party to "any other crime committed by the [principal] in 
pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural or probable consequence 
thereof." Id. 
Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that an accomplice who, after learning 
that a dangerous weapon has been used, continues to assist the principal (usually in 
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the principal's flight from the robbery) is liable as a party to the armed robbery. See, 
e.g., United States v. James, 998 F.2d 74, 80-82 (2d Or. 1993) (holding that escape 
driver with no prior knowledge that the principal would be armed is nevertheless 
aider and abettor of armed robbery if he knowingly and willfully joins in the escape 
phase of an armed bank robbery after learning that an accomplice has used a gun). 
In sum, given no controlling Utah precedent, the trial court did not obviously 
err for not requiring that the State establish that Defendant knew about the gun. See 
Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. Defendant's plain error claim, therefore, fails on this basis. 
3. If error occurred, it was harmless because overwhelming 
and undisputed evidence of a serious bodily injury 
established aggravated robbery. 
Finally, to establish plain error a defendant must show that "the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome/' Lee, 2006 UT 5, % 26 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Defendant 
has not demonstrated plain error because he has not shown that error, if any, 
resulted in harm. See Br. Petitioner at 37-38. 
A defendant may be convicted of aggravated robbery if, in the course of 
committing robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" or "causes 
serious bodily upon another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Here, the jurors were 
instructed that they could find Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery based on 
either of these two alternatives. See R117. Consequently, even if the evidence did 
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not establish that Defendant knew about the gun when he aided in the robbery, no 
harm resulted where evidence established that serious bodily injury. 
Had the trial court sua sponte concluded that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding of aggravated robbery based on the use of a gun, it would 
nevertheless have submitted the aggravated robbery charge to the jury on the 
alternative basis that the robbery resulted in a serious bodily injury. The evidence 
as to the serious bodily injury was not only sufficient, but also uncontested and 
overwhelming. See R148:27,136-37. Given the overwhelming evidence of bodily 
injury so serious that it caused Faviola's death, Defendant cannot show that "absent 
[any] error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/7 i.e., a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would not have convicted him of aggravated 
robbery. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 26; Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 13. 
D. The court of appeals correctly rejected Defendant's claim that 
counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the aggravated 
robbery charge. 
The court of appeals correctly rejected Defendant's alternative claim that 
counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge. 
Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 13.4 Defendant did not and cannot show deficient 
performance and prejudice. 
Relevant law. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first 
time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, % 6, 89 P.3d 
162. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must demonstrate 
both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment/' and that "counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Jimenez, 
2009 UT App 368, | 8 (quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 19, 12 P.3d 92 
(internal quotation marks omitted), in turn citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88 (1984)). 
In addressing the first prong of Strickland—that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness —"a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
4
 While Defendant claims trial counsel erred both in failing to move to dismiss 
and in failing to move for a directed verdict, he does not distinguish between the 
two motions. See Br. Petitioner at 35. The State therefore addresses his claim as a 
claim that counsel was deficient for failing to move to dismiss, as did the court of 
appeals. Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 13. 
strategy/7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation and internal quotation omitted). For 
instance, where the court can conceive of a legitimate tactic or strategy, counsel's 
performance is not deficient. See State v. Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, f 20,125 P.3d 103; 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 1994). 
Moreover, a defendant may not predicate a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on a novel question of law. See Lilly v. Gilmore, 988 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 
1993) ("The Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to forecast changes or 
advances in the law . . . . " ) ; cf. United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388,395 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(Sixth Amendment does not require appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous 
issue). The defendant must demonstrate "why, on the basis of the law in effect at 
the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201,1228 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
1. Counsel did not perform deficiently for not challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence to show Defendant's 
knowledge of the gun, as a reasonable strategy existed for 
not challenging that matter. 
Counsel did, in fact, move to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge. See 
R149:7. Counsel moved to dismiss on grounds that Defendant did not know that 
Mateos intended to commit a robbery. See R149:7-8. This was the only motion that 
made sense under the procedural posture of this case. As explained, the 
prosecution could have established aggravated robbery in this case based on either 
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of two aggravating circumstances — first, the use of a gun, and second, a serious 
bodily injury. Had counsel attacked the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravated 
robbery for lack of Defendant's knowledge about the gun, the aggravated robbery 
charge would still have been submitted to the jury on the alternative uncontested 
basis — serious bodily injury. And, given that in convicting Defendant of aggravated 
robbery the jury necessarily found all of the elements of robbery, see R117 (jury 
instruction 36, setting forth the elements of aggravated robbery, including those 
required to convict on simple robbery), and given the overwhelming evidence of 
serious bodily injury, see R148:27,136-37, the jury would still have convicted him on 
the aggravated robbery count. See Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, ^ 13 
Moreover, getting rid of the gun alternative would have done nothing to help 
Defendant with his murder count. As Defendant concedes, Br. Petitioner at 33, 
either robbery or aggravated robbery could have served as the predicate for the 
felony murder conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Thus, counsel had a 
conceivable strategic reason for trying to get the robbery itself, and not just the 
aggravated robbery, thrown out. If Defendant did not know about the robbery, he 
could not have knowingly and intentionally participated in it and could not have 
been an accomplice. If he could not have been an accomplice, he could not have 
been guilty of even simple robbery and therefore could not have been guilty of 
felony murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. 
In addition, counsel reasonably made a decision to run only one "I did not 
know" defense. It would have weakened the credibility of the defense to have 
argued that (1) Defendant did not know that Mateos intended to commit a robbery 
and (2) even if Defendant did know about the robbery, he didn't know about the 
gun. Where a conceivable strategic reason exists for counsel's not attacking the 
aggravating factor and for instead attacking the robbery itself, counsel's 
performance is not deficient. See Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, f 20. 
2. Counsel did not perform deficiently for not moving to 
dismiss, as no controlling precedent required that an 
accomplice know that a principal has a gun. 
As explained, in proving that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, Defendant must demonstrate "why, on the basis of the 
law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. He may not predicate a claim of ineffective assistance on a 
novel question of law. See Lilly v. Gilmore, 988 F.2d at 786; see also United States v. 
Cook, 45 F.3d at 395. 
Here, as explained under Point ICla., above, there is no controlling appellate 
law requiring that an accomplice have knowledge that a principal possesses a gun 
before he can be convicted as a party to aggravated robbery. As explained, the 
closest Utah case, Smith, 706 P.22d at 1056, suggests that such knowledge is not 
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required and that what is required is only that the accomplice intentionally aid the 
principal in committing the robbery. 
Where no Utah law provides that an accomplice to an aggravated robbery 
must know that a principal has a dangerous weapon and where the closest 
precedent suggests that such knowledge is not necessary, Defendant cannot 
demonstrate, "on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial," that counsel was 
deficient for not arguing that the evidence was insufficient. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. 
He thus cannot demonstrate that counsel was deficient for not moving to dismiss 
the aggravated robbery charge for lack of evidence of Defendant's knowledge of the 
gun.5 
5
 Defendant also claims that counsel was deficient for not "requesting] a 
lesser included offense instruction regarding robbery." Br. Petitioner at 32. The 
Court should decline review of this one-sentence conclusory claim, which lacks both 
citation to authority and "reasoned analysis based on that authority." West 
Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ^ 29,135 P.3d 874, quoting State v. Jaeger, 
1999 UT 1, Tf 31, 973 P.2d 404. 
Moreover, the "failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction" is a 
"classic example of an all-or-nothing approach, whereby counsel attempts to secure 
an acquittal by precluding the jury from reaching a compromise verdict of guilt on 
the lesser offense." See State v. Kaaloa, 2006 UT App 501U (citing State v. Hall, 946 
P.2d 712, 723-24 (Utah App. 1997)). "Such a strategy does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel" Id. (citing Hall, 946 P.2d at 723-24). 
3. Counsel did not perform deficiently for not moving to 
dismiss, because the evidence established that Defendant 
did, in fact, know that a gun was being used. 
In any event, counsel was not deficient for not moving to dismiss the 
aggravated robbery charge, also because, contrary to Defendant's claim, the 
evidence did suffice to show that Defendant knew about the gun.6 Defendant's 
girlfriend, Cassandra, testified that Defendant cruised back and forth in front of the 
salon before dropping Defendant off nearby. See R148:66-68. Laura testified that the 
driver of the green car slowed in front of the salon and then stepped on the gas as he 
repeatedly passed the salon. See R148:36-37. This testimony supports a reasonable 
inference that Defendant knew about and actively participated in the robbery and, 
consequently, may have known a gun would be used. Cassandra also testified that 
after dropping off Mateos, Defendant cruised back and forth in front of the salon, 
repeatedly telling her that she had "better get down." See R148:66-68. This evidence 
suggests that Defendant knew a gun might be used and, therefore, was urging 
Cassandra to take cover. This evidence was sufficient, in the context of this case, to 
support a reasonable inference that Defendant knew before he ever dropped Mateos 
off that Mateos had a gun and that he might possibly use it. 
6
 Again, Defendant has not marshaled the evidence relevant to his underlying 
insufficiency claim, and this Court should reject his claim on that basis alone. See 
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,f16. 
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Moreover, Cassandra testified to hearing a gunshot while she was in the car 
with Defendant. R148:68. A jury could reasonably infer that Defendant heard the 
shot too and therefore knew that Mateos had used a gun. But despite that 
knowledge and despite Cassandra's urging him to leave, Defendant remained at the 
scene after the gun was fired to pick up Mateos during his getaway and help him 
conceal his weapon. R148:68-69; see Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368,113. Under Utah 
law, an act is "'in the course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after ilie attempt or 
commission of the robbery." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3) (emphasis added); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2); see }imenezf 2009 UT App 368, \ 13. 
Thus, this evidence demonstrates that Defendant intentionally aided Mateos 
in his flight after Defendant knew not only that a gun was present, but also after he 
knew that it had been used. Thus, even if a party to an aggravated robbery must 
know that the principal possesses a weapon, the evidence was sufficient to show 
that Defendant had that knowledge and still intentionally aided Mateos in the 
commission of the robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (person is liable as party 
if he "intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense"). Because the evidence sufficed, defense counsel was not deficient for not 
moving to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge. 
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4. Defendant suffered no prejudice, as the evidence 
established that the victim suffered serious bodily injury, 
an alternative ground for convicting on the aggravated 
charge. 
Under the second prong of an ineffectiveness claim, Defendant must 
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
In making this determination, the court must consider "the totality of the evidence" 
presented. Id. "Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account 
of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings," the court must determine if it 
is "reasonably likely" that the outcome would have been different. Id. at 696. 
Here, Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. He has not shown that, had 
defense counsel moved to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge for his alleged 
lack of knowledge about the gun, there was a "reasonable probability" of a different 
outcome. 
As explained under Points IA., and IC3., and ID4., and as the court of appeals 
recognized, a defendant may be convicted of aggravated robbery if, in the course of 
committing a robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" or "causes 
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302; see also Jimenez, 2009 UT App 
368, f 13. 
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Here, the jurors were instructed that they could find Defendant guilty of 
aggravated robbery based on either of these two alternatives. See R117. Had 
defense counsel moved to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge for lack of 
evidence that Defendant knew about the gun, had the trial court ruled that prior 
gun knowledge was necessary, and had the trial court ruled that such evidence was 
lacking, the trial court would still have submitted the aggravated robbery charge to 
the jury on the uncontested alternative basis that the robbery resulted in serious 
bodily injury. See Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, \ 13. Moreover, given that the jury 
found all of the elements of simple robbery, see R117, and given that the evidence 
overwhelmingly established Faviola's serious bodily injury, see R148:27, 136-37, 
Defendant cannot show a reasonable probability that the verdict on aggravated 
robbery would have been different. 
II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE 
TRIAL COURTS IMPOSITION OF THE DANGEROUS 
WEAPON PENALTY ENHANCEMENT 
Defendant argued in the court of appeals that the trial court erred in giving a 
penalty enhancement jury instruction that did not require the prosecution to show 
that he knew that a dangerous weapon was present. Defendant had not preserved 
the claim below, but argued that the trial court committed plain error or manifest 
injustice when it gave the instruction. He also argued that defense counsel was 
J\fs-
ineffective for not objecting to the instruction. But, as explained below, the court of 
appeals correctly determined that Defendant had not established plain error, 
manifest injustice, or ineffective assistance. See Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f^ 17-18. 
A. The court of appeals correctly concluded that invited error 
precluded a finding of plain error or manifest injustice. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the 
elements of the dangerous weapon enhancement and that the improper instructions 
resulted in manifest injustice. Br. Petitioner at 38-41. Defendant cannot prevail on 
this claim because defense counsel invited any error below. 
Relevant law. This court has repeatedly held that it will not address a 
defendant's challenge to an allegedly inaccurate jury instruction where the 
defendant affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objection to it. 
"While a party who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an instruction 
assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim P. 19(e), a 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the 
trial court into committing the error." State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 
742 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Accordingly, a jury 
instruction may not be assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes 
manifest injustice 'if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to 
the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction/" Id. (quoting State 
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v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54,70 P.3d 111). This court "has recognized a number of 
ways in which a defendant has led a trial court into committing error." Id. at f 10. 
A defendant invites error "where his counsel confirmfs] on the record that the 
defense has no objection to the instructions given by the trial court." Id. He also 
invites error "when he fail[s] to object to an instruction when specifically queried by 
the court." Id. 
Proceedings in the trial court Before closing argument, the trial court asked 
both parties whether they had any objections to the jury instructions. See R149:25. 
The trial court asked defense counsel, "Will counsel for the Defendant acknowledge 
that there are no instructions that counsel have requested that I have not given." Id. 
Defense counsel answered, "Yes, I will acknowledge that." Id. The court continued, 
"You have no objection to the instructions being given?" Id. Counsel answered, 
"Yes, Your Honor," conveying that she had no objection. Id. 
Analysis. In answering the court's questions, defense counsel affirmatively 
represented that she approved all the jury instructions, including those on the 
dangerous weapon enhancement. Counsel thereby invited the error that Defendant 
now attempts to raise under the manifest injustice doctrine. See Br. Petitioner at 17 
(acknowledging that "[t]he instructions given by the court . . . at the close of all the 
evidence were approved by counsel for both parties"). Thus, review for manifest 
injustice is unavailable. 
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For this reason, the court of appeals correctly concluded that review for plain 
error did not lie. Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, ^  17. 
B. The court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant had not 
demonstrated ineffective assistance. 
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not "requesting] a 
proper instruction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the elements of 
the dangerous weapon enhancement/' Br. Petitioner at 19 (boldface and 
capitalization omitted). Defendant claims that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 
"explicitly require[s] proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware 
that a dangerous weapon was being used in the commission of a crime." Id. at 28. 
As explained, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must 
demonstrate both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment," and that "counsel's 
deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). 
Enhancements for use of a dangerous weapon. The statute governing sentence 
enhancements when a dangerous weapon is used — Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 — 
specifies the circumstances under which a party to an offense may be subject to 
increased punishment based on a co-perpetrator's use of a dangerous weapon: 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition 
as in Section 76-1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a) (i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence 
applicable by law; and 
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the minimum 
term as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law 
in the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to 
the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony; and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8. Under the statute, a party to a felony therefore is 
subject to an enhancement only if a dangerous weapon was used and the party 
"knew that the dangerous weapon was present." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(3)(b). 
Jury instructions. The trial court gave two instructions regarding the 
enhancement in this case: 
Instruction number 41. 
You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission or 
furtherance of an Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous 
weapon, he is subject to . . . an enhanced penalty. 
Instruction number 42. 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery 
occurred, you must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to 
an enhanced penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an 
enhanced penalty under Utah Law, you must find from all of the evidence 
_AfL 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that.. . [a] dangerous weapon was used in 
the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery. 
If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
convinced of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah 
Law. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that the defendant is not 
subject to an enhanced penalty. 
R122-23. 
Analysis- The jury instructions properly set forth the law regarding 
enhancements except for one provision. The jury instructions, apparently 
inadvertently, did not set forth the requirement that the defendant, as a party, 
"knew that the dangerous weapon was present/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(3). 
The instructions setting forth the elements thus could theoretically have allowed the 
jury to find Defendant subject to an enhancement on lesser proof than that required 
by the statute, and the court of appeals concluded that counsel was deficient for not 
requesting a change in the instruction. Jimenez, 2009 UT App 368, f 18. 
Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that Defendant had not established 
ineffectiveness because he had not shown that any "deficient performance was 
prejudicial —i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case/' Id. (quoting Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, f 19) (internal quotation marks and additional citation omitted). ( 
Based on the evidence, the court of appeals was correct. There was no 
reasonable probability that, absent any error, the jury would have found Defendant 
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not subject to the enhancement. The evidence showed that Defendant had planned 
the robbery with Mateos and knew what was about to happen. See R148:64-68. 
More importantly, as explained at Points IClb. and ID3., above, the evidence 
showed that Defendant knew that a gun was present and still intentionally aided 
Mateos in his flight from the robbery and in concealing his weapon after Defendant 
knew that a gun had been used. R148:69, 
As explained, the flight following the commission or attempted commission 
of a robbery is, under statute, "in the course of committing a robbery/' See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2). Thus, the evidence 
established that Defendant knew that Mateos had carried and used a gun when he 
intentionally aided Mateos during his flight and thus during the course of Mateos's 
committing a robbery. Because the evidence established that Defendant knew that 
the gun was present, Defendant cannot show that any error setting forth the 
enhancement elements affected the outcome of the case. See Jimenez, 2009 UT App 
368,118. 
Because Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice, he has not established 
that trial counsel was ineffective.7 
III. 
IF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING 
DEFENDANTS CONVICTIONS, THE REMEDY IS NOT A NEW 
TRIAL 
If this Court holds that the trial court plainly erred or that counsel performed 
ineffectively with respect to Defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, the 
Court may enter a conviction for simple robbery. This Court has "the power to 
modify a criminal judgment on appeal by entering judgment for conviction of a 
lesser included offense/' State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1210 n.4 (Utah 1993). 
"[W]hen a defendant is convicted of an offense but an error occurred at trial, a court 
has the power to enter judgment for a lesser included offense rather than ordering a 
7
 Defendant has challenged his sentencing enhancement under the plain error 
and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. While Defendant has also raised the 
alleged error in the enhancement instructions under rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., see 
Br. Petitioner at 43, the Court need not address the rule 22(e) claim, because its 
ruling on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim will resolve the issue. 
Moreover, the Court should not address the rule 22(e) claim., because it was not 
addressed by the court of appeals and because it is neither an issue included in the 
order granting certiorari nor a matter "fairly encompassed" within the issues that 
were included in the order. DeBiy v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
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retrial if (i) the trier of fact necessarily found facts sufficient to constitute the lesser 
offense, and (ii) the error did not affect those findings/' Id. at 1209 (citations 
omitted); see also State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, | 15, 126 P.3d 775; State v. 
Lyman, 966 P.2d 278,284 (Utah App. 1998). 
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that to convict Defendant of 
aggravated robbery, it had to find the elements of robbery, plus find that a 
dangerous weapon was used or serious bodily injury occurred. R117. Instructions 
33,36, and 37 set forth all of the elements of robbery, whether by a principal or by 
an accomplice. See R114-17. In finding Defendant guilty as a party to aggravated 
robbery, the jury necessarily found him guilty as a party to the lesser included 
offense of robbery. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (defining robbery) with R117 
(Instruction number 36, setting for elements of aggravated robbery). And even if the 
instructions on aggravated robbery were erroneous, that error did not affect the 
findings on the lesser included offense of robbery. Thus, this Court can properly 
enter a conviction for robbery. 
A robbery conviction is sufficient to support Defendant's felony murder 
conviction. Defendant suggests in one or two sentences that reversal of his 
conviction for aggravated robbery would require reversal of his conviction for 
felony murder because, absent the conviction for aggravated robbery, there would 
be no predicate offense to support the felony murder conviction. See Br. Petitioner 
at 35-36. Because this claim is inadequately briefed, this Court should not address it. 
See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f 11,99 P3d. 820. 
In any event, as explained, this Court may properly enter a conviction for the 
lesser included offense of robbery, which, as Defendant concedes, is also a predicate 
offense for felony murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (felony murder statute); 
Br. Petitioner at 33 (concession). 
Moreover, the jury's verdict on felony murder represented its finding that 
Defendant committed all the elements of felony murder, including robbery. See 
Instructions 35 (setting forth elements of felony murder) and 37 (setting forth 
elements of robbery). The felony murder statute does not require a conviction for 
one of the specified predicate offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. It requires 
only that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the 
predicate offense. See id. Here, the jury's finding of the elements of felony murder 
included a finding that Defendant, as a party, committed robbery. See R116 
(defining felony murder), R118 (defining robbery). Thus, even without this Court's 
entry of a conviction of simple robbery, the reversal of Defendant's aggravated 
robbery conviction would not require reversal of the felony murder conviction. 
If this Court holds that the trial counsel performed ineffectively for not 
objecting to the enhancement instructions, it may remand for resentencing to vacate 
the enhanced six-years-to-life sentence on the aggravated robbery conviction and to 
impose an unenhanced five-years-to-life sentence for that offense. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. Alternatively, the State requests that this Court tailor any grant of relief 
in the manner set forth under Point III. 
Respectfully submitted^ &Ah*hs 2010. 
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v. 
Jesus A. JIMENEZ, Defendant and Appellant. 
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Dec. 10,2009. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 2010. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in a jury trial 
in the Third District, Salt Lake Department, Deno G. 
Himonas, J., of accomplice to aggravated robbery. 
Defendant appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, P.J., 
held that defense counsel's failure to request proper 
jury instruction was not prejudicial. 
Affirmed. 
i l l Robbery 342 
West Headnotes 
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342 Robbery 
342kl5 k. Persons liable. Most Cited Cases 
Accomplice liability for aggravated robbery convic-
tion did not require that accomplice knew weapon 
was present. West's U.C.A. g 76-2-202. 
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110XXX1 Counsel 
110XXXKC) Adequacy of Representation 
110XXXKO2 Particular Cases and Issues 
110kl945 Instructions 
110kl948 k. Objecting to instruc-
tions. Most Cited Cases 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient, where 
counsel failed to object to erroneous jury instruction 
or to offer legally sufficient instruction. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
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110 Criminal Law 
110XXXI Counsel 
110XXXKQ Adequacy of Representation 
110XXXKO2 Particular Cases and Issues 
110kl945 Instructions 
110kl947 k. Offering instructions. 
Most Cited Cases 
Defense counsel's failure to request proper jury in-
struction was not prejudicial; jury had sufficient evi-
dence to find that defendant knew that accomplice 
had weapon, jury could have inferred from evidence 
that defendant knew accomplice had gun when he 
entered salon to commit robbery, defendant drove by 
salon several times, told passenger to "get down" in 
back seat of car, and waited for accomplice after gun-
shot was heard, then, despite having heard gunshot 
and passenger's plea to leave, defendant helped ac-
complice flee from crime scene, and defendant 
helped accomplice hide gun in defendant's car. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
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Before GREENWOOD, P.J, ORME and DAVIS, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
If 1 Defendant Jesus A. Jimenez appeals from his 
conviction as an accomplice to aggravated robbery 
with a one-year penalty enhancement for using a 
dangerous weapon, presenting several allegations of 
error. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1 2 On August 15, 2007, Faviola Hernandez was 
working in her salon cutting Leonel Hernandez's hair. 
Defendant drove his car to the salon, which is located 
near an intersection in Salt Lake City, Utah. Defen-
dant's girlfriend, Cassandra Matern, was sitting in the 
back seat, and another friend, Miguel Mateos, was 
sitting in the front passenger seat. Defendant passed 
the salon several times, driving west then turning 
around and driving east, then turning around and 
driving west again, and then driving north and south 
on the cross-street. 
f 3 Laura and Junior, Faviola's siblings, were playing 
at a nearby elementary school playground when they 
saw the car pass the salon several times. Video cam-
eras at the elementary school captured images of the 
car driving back and forth. Laura and Junior left the 
playground and went inside the salon. 
Tf 4 According to Matern's testimony, Defendant and 
Mateos were speaking in Spanish and she did not 
understand very much of the conversation. She be-
came suspicious about the third time they drove past 
the salon. Defendant stopped the car just south of the 
salon. Mateos got out of the car and entered the sa-
lon. Defendant turned the car around again and told 
Matern to "get down to the back seat. He told [her] 
that [she] better get down." 
If 5 According to the testimony of Leonel Hernandez, 
Faviola's customer, Mateos came in the salon, asked 
for money, pointed a gun at Leonel and told him to 
get on the ground, Mateos also told Laura and Junior 
to get on the ground. When Laura looked up, Mateos 
pointed the gun toward her. Faviola said "No. No, the 
kids. Don't hurt the kids." Mateos asked for Leonel's 
wallet and repeatedly asked Faviola for money. 
Leonel began getting money out of his wallet and 
told Faviola to give Mateos her money. Faviola went 
into the back of the salon and returned with a gun that 
she kept for protection. Then there was a gunshot and 
Mateos ran out. Leonel jumped up, locked the door, 
and called 911. Faviola told him she had been shot; 
only after she collapsed to the ground did he see 
blood coming from her chest. He tried to administer 
aid, attempting to stop the bleeding with a towel and 
telling her to keep breathing, but she stopped breath-
ing, gasped for air, and blood began pouring out of 
her nose and mouth. When the police arrived, Faviola 
was dead on the floor of the salon. 
f 6 Matern testified that after hearing the gunshot, 
she told Defendant to leave, but he refused. Mateos 
ran out of the salon, got into the back seat of the car, 
and Defendant drove away. The trio stopped at a 
nearby Wal-Mart, and, after parking, Mateos got out 
of the car and got into the front passenger seat. He 
was holding a gun. Mateos and Defendant removed 
the stereo from the car and hid the gun in the stereo 
space. Matern and Defendant went inside the Wal-
Mart but Mateos stayed in the car and changed his 
shirt. 
f 7 Defendant was convicted, as an accomplice, of 
criminal homicide and aggravated robbery with a 
one-year penalty enhancement* 463 for using a dan-
gerous weapon. He was sentenced to an indetermi-
nate prison term of fifteen years to life for homicide, 
and an indeterminate prison term of six years to life 
for aggravated robbery (five years to life plus the 
one-year penalty enhancement). The sentences were 
ordered to run consecutively. Defendant now appeals 
the aggravated robbery conviction and the one-year 
penalty enhancement. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f 8 Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was inef-
fective in failing to move to dismiss the aggravated 
robbery charges at the end of the State's case, to 
move for a directed verdict, or to request a proper 
jury instruction and object to the penalty enhance-
ment instructions. We review claims of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel raised for the first time on ap-
peal for correctness. Cf. Slate v. Perry, 2009 UT App 
51,^1 9, 204 P.3d 880. To prevail on a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 
both "that counsel's performance was deficient, in 
that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment" and "that counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial-i.e., that it affected the 
outcome of the case." Stale v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, %} 9, 12 P.3d92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687-88. 104 S.Ct. 2052. 80 L.Ed.2d 
674(1984)). 
U 9 Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in 
failing, sua sponte, to dismiss the aggravated robbery 
charge at the end of the State's case or to direct a ver-
dict of dismissal at the close of all the evidence. Un-
der the plain error doctrine, we reverse only if "(i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., ab-
sent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 1} 
26, 128 P.3d 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1f 10 Finally, Defendant asserts manifest injustice 
resulted because the trial court did not correctly in-
struct the jury on the element of aggravated robbery 
that requires the use of a dangerous weapon. "[I]n 
most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice' is 
synonymous with the 'plain error' standard." State v. 
Alinas. 2007 UT 83, 1 10, 171 P.3d 1046 (citations 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
U 11 All of Defendant's arguments are related to the 
same essential theory: that Defendant did not know 
that Mateos had a weapon and, accordingly, cannot 
be convicted of either the "aggravated" part of aggra-
vated robbery or the penalty enhancement. Defendant 
does not challenge the evidence's sufficiency to sup-
port his conviction as an accomplice to simple rob-
bery. Because the statutory requirements differ, we 
will consider the arguments in relation to each 
charge, considering Defendant's arguments first as 
they apply to the aggravated robbery conviction, and 
second as they apply to the penalty enhancement. 
I. Aggravated Robbery 
£U f 12 To establish accomplice liability for aggra-
vated robbery, the State must show that Defendant 
"solicited], requested], command[ed], encourage[d], 
or intentionally aid[ed]" Mateos in committing an 
aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(2008). Pertinent to this appeal, "[a] person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon [or] (b) causes serious bodily injury upon 
another." Id. § 76-6-302(1). Finally, simple robbery 
is outlined in Utah Code section 76-6-301: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes 
or attempts to take personal property in the posses-
sion of another from his person, or immediate pres-
ence, against his will, by means of force or fear, 
and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person 
permanently or temporarily of the personal prop-
erty; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses 
force or fear of immediate force against another in 
the course of committing a theft or wrongful ap-
propriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of 
committing a theft or wrongful appropriation" if it 
occurs: 
*464 (a) in the course of an attempt to commit 
theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful ap-
propriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission. 
Id. § 76-6-30l(l)-(2) (emphasis added). In sum, to 
convict a defendant as an accomplice to aggravated 
robbery, "the jury [must] find that [the] defendant 
solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or in-
tentionally aided another person ... to engage in the 
robbery; [the] defendant did so intentionally and 
knowingly; and a deadly weapon ... was used in the 
commission of the crime." State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 
1052. 1056 (Utah 1985). These statutes do not state 
that accomplice liability for aggravated robbery re-
quires that the accomplice knew a weapon was pre-
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sent. 
If 13 Defendant asserts that defense counsel was defi-
cient in failing to move for dismissal, and the trial 
court erred in failing to dismiss the charge sua 
sponte. However, both these arguments fail because 
Defendant falls squarely within the statutory scheme 
of accomplice liability for aggravated robbery. By its 
verdict, the jury found Defendant guilty of knowingly 
helping Mateos engage in a robbery-at the very least, 
the flight therefrom-and that Mateos used a weapon 
in the course of that robbery. The statutes do not re-
quire that the jury find that Defendant knew that 
Mateos had a gun before or during the robbery, or 
that Mateos was still using the gun while escaping. 
The evidence presented and unrebutted was that De-
fendant undoubtedly knew about the gun when he 
heard the gunshot and then saw it in Mateo's posses-
sion "in the immediate flight after the ... commission" 
of the robbery, see Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-30 l(2)(c). 
Furthermore, Defendant could have been convicted 
of aggravated robbery not on the gun element, but on 
the alternate ground that he facilitated escape after 
Mateos "cause[d] serious bodily injury upon an-
other." See id. § 76-6-302(1 )(b). Accordingly, we 
conclude that there was no deficient performance by 
defense counsel or error by the trial court related to 
Defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery. 
II. Penalty Enhancement 
If 14 Defendant was also given a one-year penalty 
enhancement because Mateos used a dangerous 
weapon, pursuant to Utah Code section 76-3-203.8 
(the penalty enhancement statute). The penalty en-
hancement statute states that "[a] defendant who is a 
party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to [a one-
year penalty enhancement] if the trier of fact finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony; and (b) the defendant knew that the dan-
gerous weapon was present." Id. § 76-6-203.8(3). 
\ 15 Thus, in order to impose the penalty enhance-
ment upon Defendant, the jury should have been 
asked to find both that Mateos had a gun and that 
Defendant knew about it. Defendant correctly asserts 
that neither the jury instructions nor the jury verdict 
form asked about Defendant's knowledge. 
Tf 16 Jury instruction 41 stated, "You are instructed 
that under Utah law, if in the commission or further-
ance of an Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a 
dangerous weapon, he is subject to to [sic] an en-
hanced penalty." Jury instruction 42 stated, 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of 
Aggravated Robbery occurred, you must further 
find whether or not the defendant is subject to an 
enhanced penalty. In order to find that the defen-
dant is subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah 
Law, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that: \}—] A danger-
ous weapon was used in the commission or fur-
therance of the Aggravated Robbery. If, after care-
ful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, 
you are convinced of the truth of this element be-
yond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant 
to Utah Law. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the fore-
going element,*465 then you must find that the de-
fendant is not subject to an enhanced penalty. 
FN1. Despite there being a " 1 " in the in-
struction, there is no "2," and use of the sin-
gular form of "element" further indicates 
there was only one element upon which the 
jury was instructed. 
The jury verdict form asked the jurors to find only 
whether "a dangerous weapon was used in the com-
mission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery." 
f 17 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
giving jury instructions that did not include knowl-
edge as an element and that defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by not objecting or requesting a 
proper instruction. However, Defendant's claim that 
the trial court committed manifest error is unavailing. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
states that "[u]nless a party objects to an instruction 
or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction 
may not be assigned as error except to avoid a mani-
fest injustice." Utah R.Crim. P. 19(e). In State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22. 70 P 3d 111, the Utah Su-
preme Court held that "if counsel, either by statement 
or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he 
or she had no objection to the jury instruction, we 
will not review the instruction under the manifest 
injustice exception" because the error was invited. Id. 
f 54. In this case, defense counsel undeniably ap-
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proved the instructions. Thus, Defendant is precluded 368 
from relief based upon manifest injustice. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
[21|"31 f 18 As a corollary, it is clear that counsel's 
performance was deficient because counsel failed to 
object to the erroneous jury instruction or to offer a 
legally sufficient instruction. However, deficient per-
formance alone does not validate a claim for ineffec-
tive assistance. We must also consider whether 
"counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial-i.e., 
that it affected the outcome of the case." Slate v. 
Litherland 2000 UT 76. f 19. 12 P.3d 92 (citing 
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668. 687-88. 104 
S.Ct. 2052. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In this case, we 
conclude that counsel's failure to request a proper 
jury instruction was not prejudicial because the jury 
had sufficient evidence to find that Defendant knew 
that Mateos had a weapon. The jury could have in-
ferred from the evidence that Defendant knew 
Mateos had a gun when he entered the salon to com-
mit a robbery: Defendant drove by the salon several 
times, told Matem to "get down" in the back seat of 
the car, and waited for Mateos after the gunshot was 
heard. Then, despite having heard the gunshot and 
Matern's plea to leave, Defendant helped Mateos flee 
from the crime scene. Finally, Defendant helped 
Mateos hide the gun in Defendant's car. Accordingly, 
we conclude that, although defense counsel was defi-
cient in failing to object to the incomplete jury in-
struction, Defendant has not demonstrated "a reason-
able probability of a different outcome," see State v. 
Clark 2004 UT 25. ^ 8. 89 P.3d 162. if trial counsel 
had successfully requested a proper jury instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
f 19 Defendant argues that he did not know that 
Mateos had a gun when Mateos left the car to go in-
side the salon. Whether Defendant knew that Mateos 
had a gun is immaterial to his conviction for aggra-
vated robbery and we find no error in that conviction. 
Although Defendant's knowledge of the gun is mate-
rial to the penalty-enhancement issue, we conclude 
that defense counsel's deficient performance did not 
affect the outcome of the case. We affirm. 
% 20 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME. and 
JAMES Z. DAVIS. Judges. 
Utah App.,2009. 
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Title/Chapter/Section: 1 G o T o I 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 2 Principles of Criminal Responsibility 
Section 202 Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for 
conduct of another. 
76-2-202, Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or 
for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
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Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 3 Punishments 
Section 203.8 Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used. 
76-3-203.8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used. 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition 
as in Section 76-1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a) (i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence 
applicable by law; and 
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the minimum 
term as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law 
in the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to 
the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony; and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony and that 
person is subsequently convicted of another felony in which a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed including those in 
Subsection (2), impose an indeterminate prison term to be not less than five 
nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
Amended by Chapter 276, 2004 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_03_020308.ZIP 2,348 
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Note 23 
volved pregnant victim by advising defendant to sisted in locking victim in closet to which he and 
enter a guilty plea to one count of aggravated other juvenile had only key, and fled scene of 
murder rather than appealing the trial court's crime, cutting phone lines to prevent other resi* 
denial of his motions to dismiss count that charged dents from calling for help. State v. Graham, 
defendant for death of unborn child; record indi- 2006, 143 P.3d 268, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2006 UT 
cated that in accepting the plea bargain, defense 43, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 983, 166 L.Ed.2d 
counsel guaranteed that defendant would not face 709. Criminal Law ®=> 238(5) 
the death penalty or life in prison without the 
possibility of parole, and while defendant could 32- Aggravating circumstances generally, 
have appealed denial of his motions to dismiss, sufficiency of evidence 
substantial risk existed that defendant could have Evidence at bindover hearing was sufficient to 
received two death sentences. Myers v. State, permit hearing court to reasonably conclude that 
2004, 94 P.3d 211, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 2004 UT defendant intentionally or knowingly kidnapped 
31. Criminal Law <s=> 641.13(5j victim, as required to support finding of probable 
cause permitting application of kidnapping as ag-
31. Intent, sufficiency of evidence gravating factor for aggravated murder; defendant 
Evidence at bindover hearing was sufficient to locked victim in closet following assault, took only 
permit hearing court to reasonably conclude that key to closet, and cut phone lines to premises 
defendant intentionally or knowingly caused vie- before fleeing, and placed victim in closet upside 
tim's death, as required to support finding of prob- down on victim's head, which had just been bat-
able cause; defendant cued another juvenile to tered with baseball bat. State v. Graham, 2006, 
strike victim over the head with aluminum baseball 143 P.3d 268, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2006 UT 43, 
bat, encouraged other juvenile to strike victim a certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 983, 166 L.Ed.2d 709 
second time, sending victim into convulsions, as- Criminal Law <s> 238(5) 
§ 76-5-203. Murde r 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 
years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 
76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(I) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or 
(v) a felony violation of Subsection 76-10-508(2) regarding discharge of a firearm or 
dangerous weapon. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
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(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the 
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the 
predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of 
the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or 
attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 
76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under 
Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that 
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of anoti 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasons 
explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable un 
the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or 
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-203; Laws 1975, c. 53, § 2; Laws 1977, c. 83, § 2; Laws 1979, c. 74, § 1; Laws 
1986, c. 157, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 227, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 10, § 9; Laws 1996, c. 123, § 1, eff. April 29, 
1996; Laws 1999, c. 2, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 90, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 101, 
§ 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2000, c. 125, § 3, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 146, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2006, c. 348, § 2, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 340, § 2, eff. April 30, 2007. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2006, c. 348, added subsec. (l)(v); inserted Laws 2007, c. 340, inserted "knowingly" in sub-
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(3)(b). "76-5-202(4)" for "76-5-202(3)". 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 301 Robbery. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Amended by Chapter 112, 2004 General Session 
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Tit]e_76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 302 Aggravated robbery. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-
1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session 
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M 2 5 2008 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Stsiis^tJ^^^j^ 
| Deputy Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH, | JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiff, | 
vs. | 
| Case No. 071906002 
JESUS A. JIMENEZ, | 
| Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
Defendant, | 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1: It's now my duty, as judge, to instruct you as to the law that 
applies to this case. And it's your duty, as jurors, to follow that law. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2: You may take the following items only into the jury room: the 
jury instructions, the exhibits admitted in evidence, your notes, and the verdict form. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: The first thing to do in the jury room is choose a "Foreperson". 
The Foreperson's duties are to keep order, allow everyone a chance to speak, and represent the jury 
in any communications that you make. The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror in 
deciding what the verdict should be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When 
that's done, a person's pride may block appropriate consideration of the case. But don't make a 
decision just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Use your common memory, common understanding, and common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the opinions 
of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, then don't 
hesitate to change your mind. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other 
than honest deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: If you think that you need more information or a clarification, 
write a note and give it to the bailiff. Fll review it with the lawyers and answer your question, if 
appropriate; however, these instructions, should contain all the information that you need in order 
to reach a verdict based upon the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6: Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You shouldn't 
use this case to correct perceived wrongs in other cases or to express individual or collective views 
about anything other than the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Put a little differently, your verdict 
should reflect the facts, as found by you, applied to the law explained in these instructions and 
shouldn't be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7: This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous on 
each element of the offense. If you all come to an agreement, then you've reached a verdict. At that 
time, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict form that reflects your decision. The 
Foreperson should then notify the bailiff that you're ready to return to court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8: After you've given me the verdict form, the clerk may ask each 
of you about it to make sure that you agree with it. I'll then excuse you. Afterward, you may talk 
about the case with anyone. Likewise, you're not required to talk about it. If anyone insists on 
talking to you about the case when you don't want to, please tell the court clerk. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9: You're instructed that the defendant, Jesus Jimenez, is charged 
in the Information with murder and aggravated robbery. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10: You're not to consider Instruction No. 9 as a statement of facts; 
rather, you're to regard it as a summary of the allegations in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not 
guilty denies each of the essential allegations of the count contained in the Information and casts 
upon the prosecution the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12: You're instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been 
arrested, charged with this offense, and held to answer to the charge, isn't any evidence of guilt or 
even a circumstance that you should consider in determining guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13: In arriving at a verdict, you shouldn't discuss or consider the 
subject of penalty or punishment. That's a matter for the Court and other governmental agencies and 
mustn't in any way affect your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14: All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This presumption is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law intended, as far as is 
possible, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in your minds until you're satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And, in the case of a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal 
Also, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case 
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with 
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law doesn't require proof that overcomes every possible 
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you're firmly convinced that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there's a 
real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16: During the trial, the lawyers asked me to determine whether 
certain evidence might be admitted. You're not to be concerned with the reasons for such requests 
or rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether evidence is admissible is purely 
a question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I don't determine what 
weight should be given such evidence, nor do I pass on the credibility of the witness. You're not to 
consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by me. As to any question 
to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been 
or as to the reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17: As I've previously explained, you're to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information. You should perform this duty uninfluenced by 
pity for or passion or prejudice against the defendant. The law forbids you to be governed by 
sentiment, sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. Both the prosecution and the defendant 
have a right to expect that you'll conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the 
evidence and apply the law of the case, to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18: The evidence that you're to consider includes the testimony of 
witnesses, exhibits received into evidence, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as stated in these instructions, and all of 
the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19: You should reconcile conflicts in the evidence as far as you 
reasonably can. But where the conflicts cannot be reconciled, you're the final judges and must 
determine from the evidence what the facts are. You should carefully and conscientiously consider 
and compare all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on any 
issue and determine therefrom what the facts are. You're not bound to believe witnesses unless their 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. 
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer number, in accordance 
with your honest convictions. If you believe a witness has willfully testified falsely as to any 
material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such a witness, or you 
may give it such weight as you think it's entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20: You're the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the 
witnesses, you've a right to take into consideration their bias, interest in the result of the suit, or any 
probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' 
deportment on the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or 
candor, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You 
should consider these matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances that you may 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21: The defendant isn't required to testify. The law expressly gives 
the defendant the privilege of not testifying if he so chooses. And if the defendant hasn't taken the 
witness stand, then you must not take that fact as any indication of guilt, nor should you indulge in 
any presumption or inference adverse to the defendant by reason thereof. The burden remains with 
the prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant testifies or not, to prove the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22: In determining any fact in this case, you shouldn't consider or 
be influenced by anything I've said or done that you may interpret as indicating my views thereon. 
You're the sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine 
the facts for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe I think. I haven't 
intended to express any opinion on what the proof shows or doesn't show, or what are or what aren't 
the facts in the case. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by my views. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23: If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated 
in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, 
you're not to single out any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others; rather, you're to 
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. Also, the 
order in which I've given the instructions has no significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24: I've tried to give you instructions embodying all of the rules of 
law that may become necessary in guiding you to a jusi and lawful verdict. The applicability of some 
of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions that you reach as to what the facts are. As 
to any such instruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion by 
me that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to 
a state of facts that you find doesn't exist, disregard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25: Courts of justice recognize and admit two classes of evidence, 
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the 
prosecution or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, 
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required 
by law. One class of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to their 
effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and 
accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any of his/her own physical senses, 
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was 
perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, 
insofar as it shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove 
by reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in 
arriving at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26: I've permitted you to take notes. Many courts don't, and a word 
of caution is in order. There's always a tendency to attach undue importance to matters that one has 
written down, but some testimony that's considered unimportant at the time presented, and thus not 
written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented. 
Consequently, your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you shouldn't 
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating 
the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence and are by no means a complete outline 
of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your memory should be your 
greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27: You shouldn't consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence of a 
fact or facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28: To constitute the crime charged in the Information, there must 
be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate 
culpable mental state or states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. Before a defendant may 
be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the Information and that the defendant 
committed such conduct with the culpable mental state required for such offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29: The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and 
connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by 
direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, and 
circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30: A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent, or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. A person engages in 
conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31: Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is 
done or omitted. Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not be proven. The 
motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your 
determination of state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32: "On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or is 
near the day alleged in the Information. "Conduct" means an act or omission. "Act" means a 
voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. "Omission" means a failure to act when there is 
a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31/ 
In this action the only 
defendant on trial is Jesus A. Jimenez. You are not to concern yourselves with the status of the 
case against the other defendant named in this trial. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of the offense of 
Criminal Homicide, Mui'der, as charged in Count I of the information, you must find from all of 
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense : 
1. On or about August 15, 2007; 
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez; 
4. As a party to the offense; 
5. While in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of a robbery; 
6. Caused the death of Faviola Hernandez. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of 
each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder, as charged in the information. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. >XJ? 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, as charged in Count II of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. On or about August 15, 2007; 
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez; 
4. As a party to the offense; 
5. Took, or, attempted to take, personal property from the person or immediate presence 
of Faviola Hernandez; and 
6. That such taking was unlawful; and 
7. That such taking was intentional; and 
8. That such taking was against the will of Faviola Hernandez; and 
9. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear; and 
10. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous weapon was used; and/or 
11 Caused the serious bodily injury to Faviola Hernandez. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robber, as charged in the information. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 7* 
Under Utah law, Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits Aggravated Robbery if in 
the course of committing Robbery, that person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or 
causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
l 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that a firearm is a dangerous weapon 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ^ 
"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal 
justification, or, illegal 
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes money. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. tfO 
An act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after 
the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission or furtherance of an 
Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is subject to to an 
enhanced penalty. 
# 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Lj*Z^ 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery 
occurred, you must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah 
Law, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that: 
1. A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Robbery. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Law. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that 
the defendant is not subject to an enhanced penalty. 
DATED THIS ^ Z ^ T D A Y OF JUNE, 2008. 
DENO & HUvfONAS, DIST-RTCJ$ 
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JUN 2 5 2008 
SALT LAKE cOUrti/ 
By__ j o A " 
Deputy cieri 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Jesus A. Jimenez, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 071906002 
1. We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A. 
Jimenez, (guilty/not guilty (circle one) of Criminal Homicide, Murder, 
a First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
DATED t h i s C ^ " 3 ~*day of v J v S R B _, 2 0 0 8 . 
12 
By-
Third Judicial Disi.ict 
JUN 2 5 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Qlftr' 
Deputy " < 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Jesus A. Jimenez, 
Defendant, 
VERDICT 
Case No. 071906002 
1. We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A. 
Jimenez, /guilty/not guilty (circle one) of Aggravated Robbery, a 
First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 2 of the Information. (If 
the answer to the foregoing question is ''guilty'7, then proceed to 2.) 
2. We, the jurors in the above case,(f ind/do not find (circle one) 
that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, charged in Count 2 of 
the Information. 
DATED this ffff&dav of tJUUg 
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